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Abstract: Understanding human filovirus hemorrhagic fever (FHF) clinical manifestations 
and  evaluating  treatment  strategies  require  the  collection  of  clinical  data  in  outbreak 
settings, where clinical documentation has been limited. Currently, no consensus among 
filovirus outbreak-response organisations guides best practice for clinical documentation 
and  data  transfer.  Semi-structured  interviews  were  conducted  with  health  care  workers 
(HCWs) involved in FHF outbreaks in sub-Saharan Africa, and with HCWs experienced in 
documenting and transferring data from high-risk areas (isolation wards or biosafety level 
4 laboratories). Methods for data documentation and transfer were identified, described in 
detail and categorised by requirement for electricity and ranked by interviewee preference. 
Some methods involve removing paperwork and other objects from the filovirus disease 
ward without disinfection. We believe that if done properly, these methods are reasonably 
safe for certain settings. However, alternative methods avoiding the removal of objects, or 
involving  the  removal  of  paperwork  or  objects  after  non-damaging  disinfection,  are 
OPEN ACCESS Viruses 2014, 6                         
 
 
928 
available. These methods are not only safer, they are also perceived as safer and likely 
more acceptable to health workers and members of the community. The use of standardised 
clinical forms is overdue. Experiments with by sunlight disinfection should continue, and 
non-damaging disinfection of impregnated paper, suitable tablet computers and underwater 
cameras should be evaluated under field conditions.  
Keywords:  viral  hemorrhagic  fever;  Ebola  hemorrhagic  fever;  Marburg  hemorrhagic 
fever; Ebola virus disease; Marburg virus disease; isolation wards; clinical documentation; 
data transfer 
 
1. Introduction 
Filoviruses,  i.e.,  marburgviruses  and  ebolaviruses,  are  highly  infectious  and  transmitted  from 
person-to-person by direct contact with infected body fluids or by contaminated fomites [1,2]. The 
case fatality ratios of filovirus hemorrhagic fevers range from 25% to 90% [1]. In order to better 
understand human clinical manifestations of FHF and to inform treatment strategies, there is a need to 
systematically collect clinical data during outbreaks.  
FHF  outbreaks  usually  attract  international  response  teams,  who  bring  additional  staff  and 
substantial amounts of equipment and supplies to the field. Nevertheless, clinical documentation inside 
filovirus disease wards during FHF outbreaks has been limited [3–8]. Data collection has not always 
been  systematic,  and  data  have  been  lost  as  clinical  records  considered  to  be  contaminated  were 
destroyed. There is a lack of guidelines or standardised procedures for documenting clinical FHF data 
and transferring them from the FHF ward to the outside, and no consensus on the safest or easiest methods.  
This study aims to contribute to our understanding of potential approaches for documenting and 
transferring clinical FHF data by conducting a survey among health care workers with relevant experience. 
2. Methods 
We conducted semi-structured interviews with HCWs involved in FHF outbreaks in sub-Saharan 
Africa,  and  with  HCWs  experienced  in  documenting  and  transferring  data  from  high-risk  areas 
(isolation wards or biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) laboratories). We used snowball sampling, starting with a 
list of HCWs personally known by two researchers on the team (PR, MB) to have filovirus experience. 
Filovirus-experienced  HCWs  were  affiliated  with  non-governmental  organisations,  public  health 
institutions responsible for disease control, and academic institutions. Interviewees with experience in 
FHF outbreaks in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of Congo (COD) (1995), Durba, COD (1998/1999), 
Gulu,  Uganda  (2000/2001),  Uí ge,  Angola  (2004/2005),  Kasai,  COD  (2007),  Bundibugyo,  Uganda 
(2007)  had  participated  in  epidemiological  investigations,  provision  of  health  care,  project 
coordination, training of local staff, organisation of filovirus disease ward, data management, etc. 
Interviews  sought  to  understand:  (1)  Reasons  for  not  collecting  or  obtaining  clinical  data,  
(2)  Methods  employed  to  date  for  data  collection  and  transfer,  (3)  Quality  criteria  for  methods,  
(4) Advantages and disadvantages of methods used to date, (5) Possible improvements for existing Viruses 2014, 6                         
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methods, and (6) Possible new methods for data collection. Telephone interviews were conducted by 
the lead author and lasted on average 15 min. Interviews were performed using an interview guide 
(Supplementary Material), were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. Data were analysed using 
qualitative research methods, i.e., a structured extraction template, organised in line with the themes 
guiding the interview described above.  
Suggestions from the first round of interviews were presented to a subgroup of interviewees who 
had been involved in FHF outbreaks in sub-Saharan Africa, because their views on the practicality of 
the suggestions were deemed to be particularly relevant. They were invited to rank by preference 
methods  of  data  documentation  and  transfer  identified  in  the  first  round.  Methods  were  grouped 
according to whether or not their application required electrical power in the filovirus disease ward.  
Verbal  informed  consent  for  participation  in  the  interview  process  was  obtained  from  all 
participants prior to the interview. Ethics approval was granted by the Ethics Committee of the London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. 
3. Results  
Forty HCWs with experience in FHF outbreaks or data documentation and transfer from BSL-4 
wards or isolation wards representing 15 organisations were initially contacted via e-mail for the first 
round  of  interviews.  Of  these,  30 individuals (75%)  from  14  organisations  (93%)  responded,  and  
21 HCW (53%) from 13 organisations (87%) agreed to be interviewed [9]. For the second round we 
contacted 16 interviewees; eight (50%) responded and agreed to be interviewed again.  
3.1. Clinical Documentation inside Filovirus Disease Wards 
Clinical documentation was reported to be often unsystematic and haphazard. While predominantly 
identified as important, many interviewees involved in FHF outbreaks did not believe that clinical 
documentation was a top priority. The importance of clinical documentation in outbreak situations has 
increased  in  HCWs‘  perceptions  in  recent  years;  however  staff  safety,  patient  clinical  care,  and 
outbreak  containment  still  ranked  higher.  High  temperatures  and  the  obligatory  use  of  personal 
protective equipment were perceived to make it difficult to remain in a filovirus disease ward longer 
than necessary  for providing  care. Many  interviewees  felt  overwhelmed by high  patient  numbers, 
particularly at the beginning of an outbreak. Filovirus disease ward responsibilities were often carried 
out by staff without prior FHF experience, who might not always appreciate the particular importance 
of clinical documentation in the context of FHF. Respondents with experience in filovirus outbreaks 
diverged on the issue of data ownership, with some believing these to belong to the hospital, while 
others thought that these should be owned by the organisation supervising the filovirus disease ward 
and collecting the data.  
Interviewees noted that to prevent their potential contamination, clinical records were kept separate 
from  the  patient  and  handled  only  after  gloves  had  been  disinfected  with  chlorine  solution.  On 
occasion, the outer pair of gloves was removed before handling the records. Nevertheless, clinical data 
were frequently destroyed intentionally, out of concern of contamination:  
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―Almost all of these data were eventually destroyed [when the paper-based clinical records] 
were sprayed with chlorine‖ (note: chlorine solution destroys paper-based records).  
3.2. Data Transfer from Filovirus Disease Wards 
3.2.1. Data Transfer Methods from Sub-Saharan Africa 
Fourteen of the 16 HCWs involved in FHF outbreaks had transferred data or had witnessed data 
being transferred out of filovirus disease wards. Data transfer was generally perceived as difficult, and 
no method currently used as quite satisfactory. Quality criteria for data transfer methods were safety, 
practicability, timeliness; readability, accuracy and comprehensiveness of the data; acceptability by 
filovirus disease ward clinicians and staff.  
A range of methods have been used in FHF outbreak settings:  
  Some methods avoided taking any objects out of the filovirus disease ward: Clinical notes were 
recorded by memory once outside the ward (n = 6 interviewees); clinical notes were dictated to a 
HCW on the other  side of the fence  (6); clinical  notes were  held up at the fence  and  then 
photographed (5), manually copied (2), or entered into a laptop computer (1) by a HCW standing 
outside the fence. 
  Other methods avoided taking paper forms out of the filovirus disease ward but involved taking 
other objects out after disinfection: Patient records were photographed inside the ward with a 
digital camera wrapped in a plastic bag, which was disinfected by chlorine before taking it out (1); 
a designated laptop was used inside the ward for data entry, sprayed with chlorine solution, and 
taken out at the end of the day (1). 
  Again  other  methods  involved  taking  paperwork  out  of  the  filovirus  disease  ward:  without 
disinfection (5), after exposing it to sun light (UV radiation; 1) or after disinfecting it with 
chlorine solution after wrapping it in plastic (1) or without doing so (1); data were copied from 
patient files into forms without touching anything else, and these forms were then taken out 
without disinfection (1); ward rounds were conducted by two HCWs, one providing patient care, 
the  other  taking  clinical  notes  without  touching  anything  on  the  ward  so  that  records  were 
considered uncontaminated and taken out without disinfection (2); following a patient‘s death, 
the  single-patient  room  including  the  patient  records  was  sealed  and  fumigated  with 
formaldehyde, the records then taken out (1).  
3.2.2. Methods used in BSL-4 Laboratories in Europe  
Methods included data transfer via fax, Internet, telephone, or voice activated dictation machine.  
In developed countries no paperwork was removed from isolation areas. When patients are treated 
inside  individual  patient  isolators,  paperwork  is  considered  uncontaminated  and  handled  without 
further procedure.  
3.2.3. Suggested Methods for the Future 
Interviewees suggested a range of methods for data collection in future filovirus outbreak settings:  Viruses 2014, 6                         
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 Enter data or scan records into a laptop computer left inside, and transmit data via Internet, a 
cable, or a USB stick disinfected with chlorine to another computer outside (n = 8 interviewees) 
 Have a person entering the filovirus disease ward and photographing the clinical records without 
touching anything else and taking the camera out without disinfection (5) 
 Enter data with a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) kept inside a plastic cover, disinfect it with 
chlorine before taking it out, or transmit data via Bluetooth or email (3) 
 Make carbon copies or photocopies of the clinical records, wrap them in a plastic cover, disinfect 
the cover and take only the copies out (2) 
 Print patient forms on transparencies, use a permanent marker to fill them out and spray them 
with chlorine (2).  
 Use a voice recorder inside the ward and transfer the audio cassette or minidisc to the outside (2) 
 Use a walkie-talkie or a cell phone to dictate clinical data to the outside (2) 
 Transmit data with a fax machine inside connected via cable to another fax machine outside (2) 
 Place documents in a container after the outbreak, leave them inside until the virus is considered 
unviable, or fumigate the container with formaldehyde (1) 
 Have a video camera pointing at the table where data are documented (1) 
3.3. Perceived Advantages and Disadvantages of Present and Future Methods 
3.3.1. General Aspects 
Actual and perceived safety was a general concern about taking material out of a filovirus disease 
ward. Although most interviewees believed it safe to take paperwork out if not visibly soiled with body 
fluids, residual, occasionally irrational doubt surrounded this issue, as illustrated in some of the verbatim 
quotes. Chlorination, fumigation or other methods of disinfection would not make all interviewees feel 
sufficiently safe about taking potentially contaminated objects out of the filovirus disease ward: 
―Who knows if there are odd chances and somebody might get Ebola from a microscopic 
bit of virus somewhere that escaped notice‖ (HCW 15). 
Another aspect was the safety as perceived by the community: even effective disinfection may not 
prevent concerns about spreading the disease into the community by taking objects out of the filovirus 
disease ward, particularly if new cases happen to emerge in the community. There was a notion that 
such ‗rumours‘ might easily lead to accusations against those supervising the ward, and should best  
be avoided:  
―If you take something out of the isolation ward and then the epidemic flairs up in the 
community again, [there would be trouble]. I mean that is an environment where there are 
a lot of rumours and perhaps … the risk is not really there, but you don‘t even want to be 
seen as taking risks‖ (HCW 14).  
Technical solutions for data transfer not requiring the removal of objects from the filovirus disease 
ward were unanimously considered to be safe. They were also thought to be practical, as data would be 
ready to be analysed. Lack of Internet connectivity, breakdown of equipment due to heat or humidity 
or loss through theft might be challenges. There was disagreement about the implications of required Viruses 2014, 6                         
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power. In remote areas of sub-Saharan Africa, where most outbreaks occur, electricity is often not 
readily available, or, if so, it may not be accessible on the filovirus disease ward itself. 
3.3.2. Detailed Advantages and Disadvantages of Methods  
HCWs mentioned the following experienced advantages and disadvantages of methods used in past 
FHF outbreaks: Writing down clinical data from memory outside the ward is safe and allows full 
concentration on clinical work inside the ward, but the accuracy of recalled data is likely to be poor. 
Spraying paperwork with chlorine can hamper its readability. Dictating over the fence is time-consuming, 
tiresome when standing in the sun in full protective gear, and can result in erroneous recordings. 
Fumigating rooms at the end of an outbreak is quick and leaves paperwork intact, but the substance is 
toxic, and fumigation, like other methods of disinfection, does not provide proof that the virus is 
unviable. Using a tape recorder is easy, but requires an algorithm to collect data in a standardised way. 
Using a camera is quick and easy for non-medical staff, but data entry from pictures for statistical 
analysis is cumbersome. Laptops sprayed with chlorine should not be expected to last long. 
HCWs  pointed  out  the  following  anticipated  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  new  methods 
suggested for future outbreaks: When a voice recorder is used inside the ward it may be damaged by 
spraying it with chlorine solution before taking it out. A fax or scanner would allow capturing the 
information of the whole patient file, including notes that ―the clinician has scribbled on the margin‖ 
(HCW  14).  PDAs  require  a  standardized  data  entry  mask  and  were  therefore  considered  as  too 
technologically  demanding  by  some,  while  others  felt  that  using  PDAs  would  be  practical  and 
relatively inexpensive.  
Nearly  all  interviewees  called  for  flexibility  in  choosing  the  method  for  documenting  and 
transferring clinical data: 
―At the very beginning you don‘t have … many resources and you might want to use … a 
very simple method … and as your team increases … you could do more sophisticated 
things‖ (HCW 2). 
3.4. Ranking of Methods 
Interviewees involved in FHF outbreaks ranked existing and suggested methods as follows: Among 
the methods not requiring electricity, the one that ranked highest was ‗entering the filovirus ward with 
two HCWs, one providing care to the patient, the other documenting clinical data‘. If the analysis of 
clinical data is urgent during an outbreak, ‗dictating over the fence‘ was ranked even higher. Among 
methods requiring electricity in the field but not on the ward, ‗using a PDA in a waterproof bag  
which is disinfected and taken outside‘ ranked highest. Among methods requiring electricity on the 
filovirus disease ward, ‗keeping a PDA on the filovirus ward that transmits data via Bluetooth or 
email‘ was preferred. 
4. Discussion 
Only a limited amount of clinical data from FHF outbreaks has been collected and preserved [4]. By 
presenting  methods  of  data  collection  and  transfer  experienced  by  health  care  workers  having Viruses 2014, 6                         
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contributed to the response to filovirus disease outbreaks we wish to raise attention to this overlooked 
problem. We are convinced that this problem exists in filovirus disease outbreaks, but it may also 
occur  during  disease  outbreaks  due  to  other  highly  pathogenic  viruses,  such  as  Lassa,  Lujo,  
Bas-Congo, Machupo or Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus. 
Most interviewees agreed that clinical documentation is a ―neglected issue‖. A primary reason for 
the scarcity of human filovirus clinical data was that an interest in clinical documentation during FHF 
outbreaks has only developed in recent years among HCWs, and still competes with other priorities in 
an outbreak situation.  
Clinical documentation of FHF infections had not been standardised in past outbreaks, while a 
standard form has only been recently developed [5]. Methods for documenting and transferring clinical 
data used until now were perceived as problematic, but several suggestions for future improvement 
were made, with a clear ranking emerging.  
The  top-ranked  method  not  requiring  electricity  was  ‗going  inside  the  filovirus  ward  with  two 
HCW, one conducts patient consultations, while another collects patient clinical data. This could be an 
appropriate method, with the advantage that the first HCW can concentrate on clinical duties and does 
not need to spend additional time in the ward for data collection. It is anyway good practice that the 
HCW providing clinical care is accompanied by a second HCW ensuring that safety procedures are 
followed (i.e., a ―buddy‖ approach). This second HCW could also be responsible for clinical data 
collection. We believe that another viable solution may be a HCW entering the ward regularly to copy 
patient files lying open on a table, without touching anything else. The copies could be taken out of the 
filovirus disease ward without disinfection with the original paperwork remaining inside. The copies 
could later be taken elsewhere and be analysed by the organisation supervising the FHF ward, subject 
to data sharing agreements with authorities of the host country. Further copies could be produced for 
the host country‘s authorities. The originals would remain on the ward, available to those providing 
clinical care, and would be destroyed at the end of the outbreak. 
The  safety  of  the  methods  described  above  depends  on  HCW‘s  ability  to  avoid  accidental 
contamination  of  the  paperwork  they  later  take  out  without  disinfection,  and  on  the  viability  of 
filoviruses on contaminated paperwork. Sagripanti et al. have carried out experiments with simulated 
sunlight in BSL4 laboratories, exposing Ebola virus to UV light ―for selected times up to 30 s‖ [10].  
3%–4% of the Ebola virus population survived due to virus being shielded in cellular debris. Although 
this is a minor fraction, it constitutes a safety risk. HCW‘s ability to avoid accidental contamination of 
paperwork  depends  on  individual  factors,  but  also  environmental  ones  like  workload,  lighting, 
crowding etc. In many, but not all situations, methods described above that aim at reducing the risk of 
accidental contamination to a minimum without ruling it out entirely may be reasonably safe, but it is 
difficult to recommend them in general: whether a method involving removing paperwork from the 
filovirus disease ward without disinfection is sufficiently safe must be decided on a case-by-case basis. 
Safety could be improved by using impregnated paper that survives treatment with disinfectant [11]. 
Data documentation forms could be printed on such paper and filled out by using a ballpoint.  
Among methods requiring electricity in the field but not on the filovirus disease ward, ‗having a 
PDA  in  a  plastic  bag  and  taking  it  outside  after  disinfection‘  ranked  highest.  As  discussed  for 
paperwork  using  PDAs  or  successor  technology  like  tablet  computers  and  smartphones  without 
disinfection can be considered as reasonably safe and feasible in certain settings. An improvement  Viruses 2014, 6                         
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over hardware protected by a plastic bag may be the use of a suitable tablet PC (Toughbook CF-H1 
Mobile Clinical Assistant, Panasonic) as described by Bente et al. for a BSL4 laboratory, which allows 
―wiping  down  with  alcohol  or  quaternary  detergents‖  and  may  ―remain  functional  after  BSL4 
decontamination  procedures  such  as  formaldehyde  fumigation  or  vaporized  hydrogen  peroxide 
treatment‖ [12]. Possible constraints include staff being unfamiliar with the technology, insufficient 
time for training during an outbreak, a technical break down under the harsh working conditions, and 
technicians  too  busy  with  other  priorities  or  lacking  the  skills  and  tools  to  repair  information 
technology equipment. We believe that a more practical and reasonably safe solution would be a HCW 
photographing  patient  records  lying  open  on  a  table  in  the  ward  without  touching  anything  else,  
and  taking  the  camera  out  without  disinfection.  This  method  is  not  technically  demanding,  and  
an  image  of  the  patient  file  would  include  information  noted  on  the  margins.  Once  outside,  the  
pictures could be uploaded on a computer and, if possible, printed out for data entry and analysis. 
Safety could be enhanced by using an underwater (dive) camera that can be dunked in disinfectant 
(e.g.,  Micro-Chem  Plus  Detergent  Disinfectant  Cleaner,  National  Chemical  Laboratories,  Inc. 
Philadelphia, PA, USA). 
Among methods requiring electricity inside the filovirus disease ward, a ‗PDA transmitting data to 
a computer outside via Bluetooth or email‘ received the highest score. However, technological solutions 
based on PDA/tablet computer/smartphone, Bluetooth and Internet may be too vulnerable for many 
outbreak settings in rural sub-Saharan Africa. We believe a scanner transmitting the image of a patient 
record to a computer outside would be quick, inexpensive, easy to handle, and technically less challenging.  
The use of battery powered respirators on filovirus disease wards has not been experienced or 
suggested by HCWs in our interviews, but has been discussed before. Although at first sight they may 
appear to provide some advantages, their use has been dismissed by those who usually run the filovirus 
disease wards. Arguments against respirators include: (i) whether respirators would be sufficiently 
comfortable for a prolonged use in the tropical climate is questionable; (ii) it would be logistically 
difficult to provide them to all potentially exposed health workers in- and outside filovirus disease 
wards;  (iii)  sustainability  for  the  period  following  the  international  response  would  be  extremely 
difficult to achieve; (iv) most importantly, they would likely foster the mis-belief that respirators are 
essential to care for Ebola and Marburg virus disease patients, and significant difficulties to recruit 
sufficient  local  and  expatriate  staff  may  be  the  consequence  when  respirators  are  not  available  
for everybody. 
Differences between outbreak settings must be taken into account: in an urban setting electricity, 
mobile phone coverage, and Internet may be available, whereas in a remote rural area, they may be 
non-existent and hard to provide. While we consider all methods discussed above to be reasonably  
safe—albeit not fool proof—in specific settings, methods which do not require taking objects out of 
the ward without disinfecting them may have the additional advantage of allaying safety concerns in 
the  community.  Given  the  tendency  of  FHF  outbreaks  to  occur  in  resource-poor  countries,  some 
solutions will in practice depend on the involvement of an international outbreak response team and 
the equipment it usually provides, and will hardly help local HCWs recording clinical data while 
treating patients prior to the arrival of such a team.  
The number of organisations and individuals with profound experience of handling filoviruses is 
limited. Our survey had a high response rate of 87% (13/15) at the organisational level, while the Viruses 2014, 6                         
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response rate was still 53% (21/40) at the individual level. Opinions of those who participated may 
differ from those who did not.  
5. Recommendations and Conclusions  
Given its free availability, the safety of using sunlight to inactivate filoviruses on paperwork by its 
UV component and exsiccation should be evaluated further with longer UV light exposure periods 
mimicking the presence of sun light in most outbreak settings in sub-Saharan Africa. If results are 
promising, a standard procedure for sunlight disinfection should be developed.  
Using a standardised form [5] in future outbreaks is crucial for improving the documentation of 
clinical FHF data. These data can then be transferred outside the filovirus disease ward, using one of 
the methods discussed above. Printing these standardised forms on impregnated paper [11], which can 
be disinfected before taking it out of the ward, should have a top priority for evaluation in a future 
outbreak. When preference is given to data transfer via tablet computer or camera, models should be 
chosen that allow disinfection. In outbreak settings with available electricity the use of scanners should 
be tested.  
We  agree  with  our  interviewees  that  safety  of  staff,  clinical  care  of  patients,  and  outbreak 
containment are top priorities. But we also believe that proper clinical documentation is crucial for 
advancing our comprehension of poorly understood diseases like FHF, and for ultimately improving 
the clinical care of FHF patients. Resources assuring clinical documentation should be made available 
at the initiation of outbreak response. Those with safety concerns should consider a study by Bausch et al., 
who have tested various clinical and environmental specimens from an Ebola disease ward for the 
presence of the virus and who concluded that ―the risk of transmission from fomites in an isolation 
ward ... is low when currently recommended infection control guidelines for the viral hemorrhagic 
fevers are followed‖ [13]. 
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